Much more important in the long run, however, is seeing clearly the political substance of the conflict within Iran. At the leadership level, this is a fight, a falling out, between wings of the fundamentalist Islamic leadership. On one side is current Ayatollah Khamenei; on the other, the “reform” opposition, those who wish to restore the approach of the initial leader, Ayatollah Khomeini! To make the point more starkly, consider this opposition led by Mir Hussein Moussavi. Under Moussavi’s leadership as prime minister through the 1980s, many thousands of Kurds, women’s rights activists, leftists and labor leaders and militants were killed in prisons and thrown into mass graves, and the war against Iraq pursued. And in the late 1990s, student protests were brutally repressed by another of Moussavi’s close allies, Mohammed Katami, with his “reform” government. Another close ally of Mouusavi is Ali Rafsanjani, considered the richest man in Iran and known as the “pistachio king.” Moussavi and Rafsanjani favor “opening up” the economy through privitization and foreign (imperialist) investment (sound familiar?). Some reform movement for democracy! Unfortunately at this time, there doesn’t appear to be any organized forces among the demonstrators that are politically independent of and in opposition to these ‘reformers.’

I turn your attention to a memo just received from a “very” reliable source well embedded in the current Regime in Iran clearly explaining the initial hours and day following the election:

On evening of 22 Khordad 1388 (12 July 2009), the Ministry of Interior (State Department/Home Office) based on the final and definitive estimates of the result of a number of votes received from the election ballots from nationwide voting centres, officially awarded Mir-Hossein Mousavi the win election (of 10th term of the IROI presidential elections) directly to Ali Khamenei. Ali Khamenei accepted Mousavi’s victory but with the precondition that Mousavi does not rush for the announcement of his win so as to avoid causing any tensions within the government and his supporters.
At the dawn of 23 Khordad 1388 (13 June 2009) a few hours after the Ministry of Interior advised Khamenei of Mousavi’s win, immediately after morning prayers, based on plan blue printed in advance, Khamenei was taken from “Beyt Rahbari (HQ of Supreme Leader)” in Pasteur Square, Tehran and transferred to a predefined location in North of Tehran, in Aghdassieh.

While in transit to North of Tehran, the IRGC command deployed at the HQ of Supreme Leader advised Khamenei through Mojtaba Khamenei (his son) that the reason for this transfer is because of a “Condition Grey” and the transfer is as per instruction from “IRGC Motahari Central Command”. During the transit, the special force battalions 1, 2 and 3 along with protection team of Khamenei’s family and the Physical Protection Team plus in addition to the Check and Neutralize Team were completely transferred from the HQ of Supreme Leader to the destination North Tehran where Khamenei was headed.

On completion of transfer of Khamenei, the expansion of coup d’état operations (which had started the previous day) was initiated throughout the city under code name “Maneuvre Eghtedar (Authority Maneuver)”. Simultaneously with this maneuver which surprised and uncovered its true nature as a coup d’état, military and special forces coup d’état units deployed throughout the city.
Although forces behind the coup d’état code named “Maneuver Authority” all were equipped with black police uniform and the maneuver was given the tone being run by the police but the leadership and command was led by a Council which consisted of senior IRGC commanders and the head of the police force, “Ahmadi-Moghaddam”. The majority of the commanders implementing the maneuver were also commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were not police commanders. “Mojtaba” second son of Ali Khamenei represented the Supreme Leader’s Office who was in direct contact with the Council for the coordination and implementation of the coup. The Council having predicted resistance by Mir-Hossein Mousavi and his camp had prepared in advance an initial (work in progress) arrest list which was completed at later stages of the coup.

It is not clear at this juncture if on 13 June 2009, during the implementation of the coup in Tehran if Khamenei was provided with updates and progress reports with regard to the status of the coup implementation in Tehran, however, what is crystal clear is that Khamenei through his son Mojtaba was in direct contact with those in charge of the coup and that he became a supporter of the coup movement after he was bri efed earlier in the day. What is become increasingly clear is the whole planning for the coup may have been a premeditated plan by Mojtaba to remain arms length and avoid having been on record having given the initial instruction to initiate the coup and for public consumption purposes (and damage control purposes which may come in handy at a later stage) provide the impression that he/Mojtaba had only entered the scene and became aware of the coup at a later stage after the coup had become a foregone conclusion and that he/Mojtaba only became a supporter of the coup.